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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY 
STATE OF GEORGIA 
COpy 
BARTON PROTECTIVE SERVICES, LLC ) 
and SPECTAGUARD ACQUISITION, LLC, ) 
) Civil Action No.: 2006CV115190 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
CHARLES BARTON RICE, SR., CHARLES) 
BARTON RICE, JR. TRUST, KIMBERLY ) 
ANN RICKEY TRUST, KATHRYN ) 
PROULX, and THE BANK OF NEW YORK ) 
TRUST COMPANY, N.A. ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
FILED IN OFFICE 
MAR I 02008 
DEPUTY CLERK SUPERIOR COURT 
FULTON COUNTY GA 
ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Counsel appeared before the Court on February 5, 2008, and February 21, 2008, to 
present oral arguments on the following motions: (1) Shareholder Defendants' Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment, filed August 27, 2007; (2) Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed 
October 2, 2007; (3) Shareholder Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed December 
17, 2007; (4) Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on Shareholder Defendants' 
Counterclaims, filed December 17, 2007; and (5) Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment on Plaintiffs' Claims, filed December 17, 2007. 
After reviewing the record of the case, the briefs submitted on the motions, and the 
arguments presented by counsel, the Court finds as follows: 
I. Facts 
This case involves a series of claims brought by Plaintiffs after a purchase of Shareholder 
Defendants' company ("Barton") for breached representations and warranties, as well as two 
counterclaims brought by Shareholder Defendants. 
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On May 12, 2004, Plaintiffs and Defendants Charles Barton Rice, Sr., Charles Barton 
Rice, Jr. Trust, Kimberly Ann Rickey Trust, and Kathryn Proulx (collectively, the "Shareholder 
Defendants" or "Shareholders") entered into an Agreement and Plan of Merger (the "Merger 
Agreement") to purchase Barton. On August 2, 2004, the parties closed the Merger Agreement 
and executed an escrow agreement (the "Escrow Agreement"). 
The Merger Agreement contained a series of representations, warranties, and covenants. 
In addition, the Merger Agreement defined the parties' indemnification obligations. 
Under the terms of the Escrow Agreement, the first $9 million of the purchase price was 
placed into an escrow account (the "Escrow Account") to serve as the source for the payment of 
claims relating to the Merger Agreement. The Merger Agreement defined the procedures for 
Plaintiffs to submit Escrow Account claims (a "Claim Notice") and for Shareholder Defendants 
to respond (a "Claim Notice Response"). 
On February 17, 2006, Plaintiffs delivered to Shareholder Defendants and the Escrow 
Agent a Claim Notice alleging several Merger Agreement breaches and demanding the release of 
certain Escrow funds. In March, Shareholder Defendants responded with a Claim Notice 
Response denying Plaintiffs' claims and instructing the Escrow Agent not to release any funds. 
On April 10, 2006, Plaintiffs filed this action alleging various warranty, representation, 
and covenant breaches. 
II. Standard 
A court should grant a motion for summary judgment pursuant to D.C.G.A. § 9-11-56 
when the moving party shows that no genuine issue of material fact remains to be tried and that 
the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant, warrant summary 
judgment as a matter of law. Lau's Corp., Inc. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491, 491 (1991). The 
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moving party need only eliminate one essential element of a party's claim to prevail on summary 
judgment. Real Estate Int'l Inc. v. Buggah, 220 Ga. App. 449, 451 (1996). 
III. Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment Relating to Claim Notice Response 
Plaintiffs seek summary judgment from the Court on the grounds that Shareholder 
Defendants' Claim Notice Response did not comply with the notice terms of the Merger 
Agreement. 
On February 17, 2006, Plaintiffs delivered to Shareholder Defendants and the Escrow 
Agent a Claim Notice. On February 24, 2006, Shareholder Defendants sent a response letter 
acknowledging their receipt of the Claim Notice and stating their intent to object to it. 
Pursuant to Section 16 of the Merger Agreement, Shareholder Defendants had twenty 
(20) days (until March 9, 2006) to respond with a Claim Notice Response. Additionally, the 
Merger Agreement set forth the manner in which notices were to be sent specitying Plaintiffs' 
General Counsel's fax number and certain forms of certified mail. On March 7, 2006, 
Shareholder Defendants sent a Claim Notice Response denying Plaintiffs' request and instructing 
the Escrow Agent not to release any funds from the Escrow Account. Shareholder Defendants 
sent the Claim Notice Response to Plaintiffs by regular u.S. mail and fax, but transposed one 
digit in the fax number. Plaintiffs' General Counsel received the U.S. mail letter on March 10, 
2006, which indicated that the response had also been sent by fax. The General Counsel then 
checked the office fax machines and recovered Shareholder Defendants' fax sent on the ih, 
which was sitting on the machine next to the machine for the designated number. 
On March 17, 2006, Plaintiffs sent a response letter to Shareholder Defendants stating 
that the Claim Notice Response was not received in accordance with the terms of the Merger 
Agreement. Citing Section 5(a) ofthe Escrow Agreement, Plaintiffs stated that the claims in the 
Claims Notice were deemed to be accepted. Thereafter, Shareholder Defendants responded and 
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re-sent their Claim Notice Response by fax, this time to the correct fax number, and by certified 
mail. 
Plaintiffs argue that the plain language of the Merger Agreement requires compliance 
with the twenty (20) day response window for Claim Notice Responses and the form of notice 
delivery. Plaintiffs claim that Shareholder Defendants' failure to comply strictly with the notice 
provisions entitles them to summary judgment. 
Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 13-4-20, performance "substantially in compliance with the letter 
and spirit of the law" may satisfY a party's obligations. See, M.,., Rome Health Care, 264 Ga. 
App. 265 (2003) (holding that default and termination notices "substantially complied" with the 
notice provisions of the contract sufficient to affirm the trial court's refusal of a directed verdict 
on the issue); Wallick v. Period Homes Ltd., 252 Ga. App. 197, 203 (2001), ("Substantial 
compliance with notice provisions, however, may suffice so long as the information is 
communicated."). Here, Shareholder Defendants indicated their intent to object in their initial 
communication on February 24th and then sent their Claim Notice Response on March 7th by fax 
and regular mail. The fax was received on March 7th, although it was not seen by the General 
Counsel until the 10th. The fax number used in the first Claim Notice Response was one digit off 
of the number designated in the Merger Agreement, was sent to a fax machine sitting next to the 
designated machine, and was a number that Shareholder Defendants had used to correspond with 
the General Counsel on previous occasions. In accordance with the doctrine of substantial 
compliance, as codified in O.C.G.A. § 13-4-20, the March i h Claim Notice Response 
substantially complied with the notice requirements under Section 16 ofthe Merger Agreement. 
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In addition, to award Plaintiffs all the momes in the Escrow Account because of 
Shareholder Defendants' failure to use the correct fax number and failure to send the Claim 
Notice Response by certified mail, as opposed to regular U.S. mail, would result in a windfall for 
Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' General Counsel testified that he would not have acted differently had the 
Claim Notice Response been sent to the correct fax number on March ih. A party is only 
entitled to damages necessary to make it whole or to reflect the benefit of the bargain; anything 
more is a windfall. See Ryland Group v. Daley, 245 Ga. App. 496, 503 (2000). Such an award 
for a technical error would be a windfall to Plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment in connection with the late-received Claim 
Notice Response is hereby DENIED. 
IV. Shareholder Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Damages 
Theory 
Shareholder Defendants move for summary jUdgment on the issue of damages for several 
of the claims. Shareholder Defendants characterize these damages as seeking consequential 
damages, which, they argue, are excluded from Plaintiffs' indemnification rights under the 
Merger Agreement. Shareholder Defendants also challenge Plaintiffs' use of a multiplier in 
calculating their damages amounts, and thus, Shareholder Defendants argue that if 
"consequential" damages are excluded and the use of a multiplier is disallowed, Plaintiffs cannot 
exceed the $1.85 million damages threshold in order to recover any money from the Escrow 
Account. 
Shareholder Defendants object to several breach claims on the grounds that the damages 
sought are excluded by Section 12 (Indemnification) of the Merger Agreement. Section 12.2 
states that Barton and the Shareholder Defendants shall jointly and severally "indemnify, defend 
and hold harmless ... [Plaintiffs] .. from and against any and all Damages which arise out of, result 
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from, or relate to (a) any breach of any representation or warranty made by [Barton and 
Shareholder Defendants] .... " Damages are defmed in the Merger Agreement as "the amount of 
any loss, liability, claim, damage (excluding incidental and consequential damages", expense 
(including reasonable costs of investigation and defense and reasonable attorneys' fees), whether 
or not involving a Third Party Claim." Finally, Section 12.8 states that the indemnification rights 
in Section 12 are the "exclusive remedies" of the parties. Shareholder Defendants argue that 
Plaintiffs' damages theory with respect to the CUMA and AAFES claims are consequential 
damages and therefore excluded from the definition of Damages. 
Plaintiffs agree that consequential damages are excluded by the Merger Agreement, but 
they contend that they are not asking for consequential damages; they are asking for the 
difference between the value of certain matters or contracts they purchased from Barton and the 
value of what they actually received. 
Consequential damages are those claimed to result as a secondary consequence of the 
defendant's non performance while general damages are those which generally flow from the 
breach. Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies, § 12.4(3) § 12.2(3). Often claims for consequential 
damages are claims for "lost profits." But sometimes "lost profits" are used to show the value of 
the enterprise that a party was promised as opposed to the value that the party received. See 
Dobbs § 12.3(4). In such a case, they would not be consequential damages. 
The Court of Appeals in Imagining Systems International Inc. v. Magnetic Resonance 
Plus, Inc., 237 Ga App. 640, 644 (1997) recognized that there are two types of "lost profits" -
those that are consequential damages and those that are direct or general damages. 
The Damages defmition in the Merger Agreement excludes consequential damages, but 
make no mention of "lost profits." 
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Damages related to a breach of warranty are typically calculated by subtracting the value 
of the thing as conveyed from the value of the thing as warranted. Franklin v. Augusta Dodge, 
Inc., 287 Ga. App. 818, 823 (2007) (afftrming a trial court's calculation of warranty damages as 
the difference at the time and place of acceptance between the value ofthe goods as accepted and 
the value of the goods as warranted). In this case, Plaintiffs purchased a company that they 
projected to have a certain degree of profitability based upon the representations and warranties 
of the Shareholder Defendants. If those representations and warranties were breached so that the 
value of the company at the time of the Closing was decreased, the natural measure of damages 
would be the difference between the value of Barton as warranted versus the value of Barton as 
delivered. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' damages claims are not excluded by Section 12 of the Merger 
Agreement. 
The Court hereby DENIES Shareholder Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on 
the issue of damages. 
v. Defendant Shareholder Motion for Summary Judgment on AU Remaining Claims & 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on Certain Plaintiffs' Claims 
Plaintiffs' Complaint seeks recovery from the Shareholder Defendants for various alleged 
breaches of representations, warranties, and covenants in the Merger Agreement. Shareholder 
Defendants moved for summary judgment on all of these claims, and Plaintiffs filed their own 
motion for summary jUdgment on the liability issue of four of the alleged breaches. Each claim 
is addressed below. 
A. CUMA 
Plaintiffs contend that prior to August 2, 2004, (the "Closing Date" of the Merger 
Agreement), Barton was not in compliance with a California labor regulation requiring it to pay a 
weekly uniform maintenance allowance to certain types of employees ("CUMA"). Cal. Labor 
Code § 2802; Cal. Code Regs. Titl. 8, § 11070(9)(a); California Division of Labor Standards 
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Enforcement ("CDLSE") Minimum Wage Information Sheet, DLSE-2007-M(2007); CDLSE 
Opinion Letters 1991.02.13and 1994.02.16-1. Since discovering the issue a few weeks after the 
Closing, Plaintiffs began paying an additional $6.75 per week to the affected employees. 
Plaintiffs allege that Barton's failure to comply with the CUMA requirements violated 
representations and warranties contained in Section 3.11 (Compliance with Laws) and Section 
3.8 (No Liabilities) of the Merger Agreement. 
1. Section 3.11 Compliance with Laws 
The parties disagree about the meaning of Section 3.11 of the Merger Agreement. 
Shareholder Defendants argue that to prove a breach under this section, Plaintiffs must 
demonstrate both a violation of a law and notice received by Shareholder Defendants. Plaintiffs 
argue that Section 3.11 contains three separate representations. 
Contract construction is a matter of law, and trial courts should interpret them according 
to the general rules of contract construction set forth in O.C.G.A. § 13-2-2. Glisson v. IRHA of 
Loganville, Inc., _ S.E.2d _, 2008 WL204624 * 1 (Jan. 25, 2008). First, a court must 
determine whether the contract is clear or ambiguous, which is a question of law. If no 
ambiguity exists, the court should enforce the contract according to its terms, looking only to the 
contract for its meaning. O.C.G.A. § 13-2-2; Glisson, 2008 WL204624, at *1. 
This Court finds Section 3.11 to be unambiguous. Section 3.11 represents and warrants 
that, except as set forth on the applicable disclosure schedule, (i) Barton complied in all respects 
with and was not in violation of any applicable law or order, (ii) Barton had not received notice 
of a violation or advice that it was not in compliance with an applicable law or order, and (iii) to 
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the knowledge of certain Shareholders, I no circumstances existed that were likely to result in 
such a violation. 
Shareholder Defendants argue that Barton had not received notice of a violation and that 
notice, in addition to a violation of a law, is required. This Court finds Section 3.11 to contain 
three separate representations and warranties. Plaintiffs are relying on the representation and 
warranty in subsection (i). 
Plaintiffs presented deposition testimonl that Barton failed to pay either a higher wage 
incorporating an additional amount for the allowance, or to segment out the allowance costs from 
the employees' existing salaries. Shareholder Defendants' however, point to Barton's past 
president Pat McNulty's deposition testimony that Barton complied with CUMA by notifYing 
employees of its policy that their higher wages encompassed the allowance. See, Gattuso v. 
Harte-Hanks Shoppers, Inc., 169 P.3d 889, 900 (Cal. 2007). Thus, whether or not Barton 
violated CUMA is a question of fact for the jury. 
2. Section 3.8, No Liabilities 
Under Section 3.8, Barton and the Shareholder Defendants represented and warranted 
that Barton had no liabilities required to be disclosed by GAAP,3 except those listed on in the 
disclosure schedules, fmancial statement liabilities, and certain post-interim balance sheet 
liabilities. Plaintiffs remedied the perceived violation of CUMA by paying the affected 
employees $6.75 a week more, and they allege that such additional liability should have been 
1 The Merger Agreement defines "knowledge," for purpose of the knowledge qualifier, as the actual knowledge of 
certain of the Shareholders. 
2 Defendants challenge Plaintiffs' reliance on Ms. Ritts' deposition testimony that Barton failed to pay the CUl\B. on the 
basis that she has no personal or professional knowledge regarding the CUM,.-\. requirements. )\1s. Ritts' testimony, 
however, relates to Barton's payroll records and the absence of an identified CUl\L-\' payment therein. Segmentation of a 
CUl\L-\. payment is not required, but in its absence, the employer (e.g., Barton) must be able to demonstrate that it 
communicated its method of determining the CUj\L-\. portion of compensation intended as expense reimbursements 
under the statute. Gattuso v. Harte-Hanks Shoppers, Inc., 169 P.3d 889. 900 (Cal. 2007) . 
.1 "Under G.-\..AP, 'liabilities are claims of creditors against the enterprise, arising out of past activities, that are to be 
satisfied by the disbursement or utilization of corporate resources." "-\.ccounting for Contingencies, Statement of 
Financial Accounting Standards No.5. 
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disclosed under Section 3.8. Since the question of whether Barton violated its CUMA 
obligations is reserved for a jury, summary judgment on this alleged breach of Section 3.8 is 
premature. 
3. Damages 
Shareholder Defendants argue that Barton only represented that it was in compliance with 
any applicable laws as of the date of Closing and that since Plaintiffs paid no sums to the 
affected employees for the allowances prior to Closing, Shareholder Defendants are not liable for 
the amounts claimed. 
Section 12.1 of the Merger Agreement, however, provides that all representations and 
warranties survive the Closing for 18 months. Fact questions remain as to whether there was a 
violation of CUM A and ifso, were there damages and how to measure those damages. 
The Court hereby DENIES both Shareholder Defendants' and Plaintiffs' Motions for 
Summary Judgment. 
B. AAFES 
Plaintiffs allege that Barton failed to pay certain employee holiday and vacation pay as 
required under their contract with the Army & Air Force Exchange Service ("AAFES"). After 
discovering the fact, Plaintiffs began paying the affected employees for the holiday and vacation 
time from the date of the Closing forward, but did not pay the employees for any pre-Closing 
periods. Plaintiffs allege that Barton's failure to pay such holiday and vacation pay under the 
AAFES contract violated Section 3.16 (Material Contracts) and Section 3.8 (No Liabilities). 
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1. Section 3.16(b) Material Contracts 
Under Section 3 .16(b) Barton and the Shareho lder Defendants represented and warranted, 
in part, that, except as set forth on the applicable disclosure schedule, (i) Barton was not in 
violation or breach of any Material Contract4, and (ii) to the knowledge of certain Shareholders, 
no other party to a Material Contract was in violation or breach ofa Material Contract. 
First, Shareholder Defendants assert that the knowledge requirement applies to Barton's 
breach of a Material Contract in addition to a breach by a third party. This Court disagrees and 
construes the knowledge requirement-which is set off by commas placed before the phrase 
"other party," and which is not placed at the beginning of the representation/warranty-to be 
applicable only to a breach by a third party. 
Second, Shareholder Defendants assert that Plaintiffs had the opportunity to perform due 
diligence on the AAFES contract prior to Closing. If due diligence or access to information prior 
to closing an agreement was a defense to representations and warranties, it would render such 
clauses virtually meaningless. Due diligence and access do not negate the effect of a 
representation or warranty. 
2. Section 3.8, No Liabilities 
Under Section 3.8, Barton and the Shareholder Defendants represented and warranted 
that Barton had no liabilities required to be disclosed by GAAP, except as those listed on in the 
disclosure schedules, financial statement liabilities, and certain post-interim balance sheet 
liabilities. Plaintiffs allege that the unpaid holiday and vacation pay under the AAFES contract 
was a liability that should have been disclosed, and failure to do so, breached Section 3.8. 
4 Material Contract is defined in Section 3.16(a) of the Merger Agreement. 
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Shareholder Defendants argue that smce Plaintiffs paid no sums to the affected 
employees for work prior to Closing, Shareholder Defendants are not liable for the amounts 
claimed. Whether damages should be awarded and how to calculate damages are questions 
reserved for a jury. 
The Court hereby GRANTS Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of 
liability for breach of Section 3.16(b) and Section 3.8 of the Merger Agreement, and hereby 
DENIES Shareholder Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
C. Employment Agreements 
Barton and the Shareho lder Defendants represented and warranted under Section 3 .16(b) 
that each Material Contract was in full force and effect and constituted a legal, valid and binding 
agreement of Barton and, to the knowledge of certain Shareholders, ofthe other party to each 
Material Contract. Based on the Georgia case law at the date ofthe Closing, the restrictive 
covenants contained in the employment agreements with former Barton employees, Todd Carroll 
and John Garrigan, were unenforceable by Plaintiffs. SecurAmerica LLC, Mr. Garrigan's new 
employer, obtained a final order against Plaintiffs declaring that the restrictive covenants in Mr. 
Garrigan's employment agreement were unenforceable. Admiral Security, Mr. Carroll's new 
employer, brought a similar suit challenging substantially similar provisions of Mr. Carroll's 
employment agreement. This suit was settled after the conclusion of the SecurAmerica suit. 
Plaintiffs are not seeking monies paid to third parties, but rather they are seeking Plaintiffs' 
attorneys' fees incurred in the Carroll case. 
Whether Plaintiffs were damaged by the unenforceability of these two contracts and whether 
they suffered any compensatory damages are questions that remain. 
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D. Cousins 
Plaintiffs allege that Barton modified a security guard services contract with Cousins 
Properties, Inc., between the signing date of the Merger Agreement and the Closing Date. The 
renegotiated contract decreased the rates of payment to Barton, then Plaintiffs, for the remainder 
of its existing contract period which ended December 2004, and extended the term of the 
contract to 2007. Plaintiffs allege that the renegotiation of the Cousins' contract terms breached 
certain representations and warranties contained in Section 3.16(a) and covenants contained in 
Section 5.2. 
1. Section 3.16(a), Materials Contracts 
Under Section 3.16(a), Barton and Shareholder Defendants represented and warranted 
that they disclosed all Material Contracts, including those required under subsection 3.16(a)(v) 
where the customer paid $750,000 or more during the fiscal year ending October 25, 2003, and 
that Barton did not disclose the revised contract. To begin, Plaintiffs argue that the language in 
subsection 3.16(a)(v) requires the disclosure oflater contracts with customers who paid $750,000 
or more in the 2003 fiscal year. Plaintiffs' arguments, however, are without merit based upon 
the plain language ofthe provision and the disclosure obligation that it created for Barton and the 
Shareholder Defendants. 
2. Section 5.2, Conduct of Business 
Under Section 5.2, Barton and the Shareholder Defendants represented and warranted 
that Barton would continue to conduct its business in the Ordinary Course of Business5 until the 
Closing Date including to refrain from modifying or amending a material term of any Contract 
5 Ordinary Course of Business is defined in the Merger Agreement to mean, "with respect to a Person, an action or 
failure to act generally consistent with the past custom and practices of such Person and is taken or not taken in the 
ordinary course of the normal day-to-day operations of such Person." 
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that ''would result in a material decrease in the rights or benefits to [Barton] thereunder." 
Whether or not this contract was renegotiated in the "ordinary course of business" and whether 
the renegotiated rates resulted in a "material decrease" under Section 5 .2( 0), are questions of fact 
for a jury to determine. 
Shareholder Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on the alleged breach of Section 
3.16(a) for non-disclosure of the renegotiated Cousins contract is hereby GRANTED, but 
Shareholder Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on the alleged breach of the Section 5.2 
is hereby DENIED. 
E. Pillowtex 
In 2003, Pillowtex Corporation paid Barton over $500,000 in connection with a debt. In 
July of that same year, Pillowtex filed for Bankruptcy under Chapter 11. In September 2005, the 
Chapter 11 trustee filed an adversary proceeding against Plaintiffs to recover the payments made 
to Barton as alleged pre-petition preference payments. Plaintiffs settled the proceeding for 
$62,000. Plaintiffs allege that Pillowtex preference payment breached Section 3.8 (No 
Liabilities) and Section 3 .11 (Compliance with Laws). 
1. Section 3.8, No Liabilities 
The representations and warranties covered under Section 3.8 are addressed above in 
section V.B.2 of this Order. The liability did not exist prior to the Closing Date. The mere 
possibility ofa yet-to-be determined claim is insufficient to qualify as a breach of Section 3.8. 
2. Section 3.11, Compliance with Laws 
Section 3.11 is discussed above in section V.A.1 of this Order. Shareholder Defendants 
argue that because they did not have notice of the alleged violation, they are not liable for the 
refunded amounts. In its analysis of the CUMA claims, this Court already determined that 
Section 3.11 contains three separate representations and warranties. Here Plaintiffs are relying 
on subsection (i) which states that Barton complied in all respects with and was not in violation 
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of any applicable law or order. Shareholder Defendants argue that because the preference 
payment proceeding was settled, Barton was never found to have violated any law in connection 
with receipt of payments from Pillowtex. Plaintiffs submitted an affidavit of Plaintiffs' General 
Counsel, stating that based upon his analysis of the law and facts of the dispute, the amount of 
the settlement violated 11 U.S.C. § 547. His affidavit is sufficient to withstand a motion for 
summary jUdgment. 
Shareholder Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on the alleged breach of Section 3.8 
IS hereby GRANTED, but under Section 3.11, questions of fact remain. Shareholder 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment under Section 3.11 is hereby DENIED. 
F. Twin Hill 
Plaintiffs allege that Shareholder Defendants failed to disclose a September 10, 2003 
letter agreement with Twin Hill Acquisitions, Inc. in violation of Section 3.16(a), which is 
discussed in section V.D.1. of this Order. The Twin Hill letter agreement, however, was 
superseded by a comprehensive agreement on October 24, 2003, which was disclosed to 
Plaintiffs in the appropriate disclosure schedule to the Merger Agreement. Because the second 
agreement replaced the earlier one, Shareholder Defendants' had no obligation to disclose the 
Twin Hill earlier letter agreement. 
Shareholder Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on the alleged breach of Section 
3.16(a) regarding the Twin Hill letter agreement is hereby GRANTED. 
G. Tabor/Equity Office Management 
Both before and after the Closing Date, Equity Office Management (the company that 
operated the Tabor property), disputed various invoices from Barton and then later from 
Plaintiffs. To resolve the disputes, Plaintiffs refunded Tabor the disputed amounts, 
approximately $22,000 of which was attributable to pre-Closing Barton errors. Plaintiffs allege 
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that the Tabor dispute, which was not disclosed to Plaintiffs, violated Section 3.8(No Liabilities) 
and Section 3 .16(b) (Material Contracts). Shareholder Defendants argue that because they had 
no knowledge of such overpayments, Plaintiffs' claim fails. Consistent with this Court's 
interpretation of the knowledge requirement in Section 3.8 and Section 3.16(6), Shareholder 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby DENIED. 
H. Licensing Violations 
Plaintiffs paid fines for various licensing violations in New York6 that were a result of 
Barton's pre-Closing actions. Plaintiffs allege that the various licensing violations breached 
Section 3.11(Compliance with Laws), which is addressed above in section V.A.1. of this Order. 
In accordance with the foregoing, Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on the licensing 
violation claims is hereby GRANTED, and Shareholder Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment is hereby DENIED. 
VI. Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on Shareholder Defendants' 
Counterclaims 
Plaintiffs urge this Court to award them summary judgment on Shareholder Defendants' 
counterclaims for declaratory judgment regarding entitlement to the Escrow Account funds and 
attorneys' fees. Plaintiffs argue that their Complaint properly puts the question of entitlement to 
the Escrow Account funds in question and that Shareholder Defendants' declaratory judgment 
counterclaim is merely a recasting of Shareholder Defendants' defenses raised in their Answer. 
Thus, Plaintiffs argue, there is no actual, justiciable controversy that justifies a claim for a 
declaratory judgment under O.C.G.A. § 9-4-2(a). 
In addition to a declaration that Shareholder Defendants' position is correct, Shareholder 
Defendants' counterclaim for declaratory judgment seeks an order directing the Escrow Agent to 
6 The Complaint and Plaintiffs' briefs also mention North Carolina licensing fines. However, they discussed only the 
$6500 fine from New York. Claims relating to North Carolina licensing fines have not been addressed. 
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release to them the funds in the Escrow Account on the grounds that Plaintiffs failed to comply 
with the indemnification procedures outlined in Section 12. Because entitlement to the funds in 
the Escrow Account is yet to be determined, Plaintiffs' motion must be denied. Therefore, 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on Shareholder Defendants' Counterclaim for 
declaratory judgment is hereby DENIED. 
Shareholder Defendants' other counterclaim seeks attorneys' fees and expenses for their 
declaratory judgment claim in addition to attorneys' fees for Plaintiffs' breach of the Merger 
Agreement and Plaintiffs actions in bad faith under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11. 
Attorneys' fees and expenses may not be awarded in connection with a declaratory 
judgment action. General Hospitals of Humana, Inc. v. Jenkins, 188 Ga. App. 825 (1988) 
(reversing an award of attorneys' fees and expenses on a declaratory jUdgment action). Thus, 
Shareholder Defendants' claim for attorneys' fees and expenses may not proceed on the 
declaratory judgment claim. 
Shareholder Defendants contend that Plaintiffs breached the Merger Agreement by their 
failure to give timely notice of some of the claims and to provide sufficient information 
regarding each claim as required by the Merger Agreement. These contentions require findings 
of fact. Consequently, Shareholder Defendants' claims for attorneys' fees and expenses for 
breach of the Merger Agreement or under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 may proceed to trial. 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on Shareholder Defendants' Counterclaim for 
attorneys' fees and expenses is hereby GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. 
VII. Conclusion 
Because there were many separate motions for summary judgment and many separate 
issues, the Court will not attempt to summarize them. Each issue is addressed earlier in this 
Order. 
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.~ SO ORDERED this It; day of March, 2008. 
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